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Abstract
We study robust welfare comparisons of learning biases, i.e., deviations from
correct Bayesian updating. Given a true signal distribution, we deem one bias
more harmful than another if it yields lower objective expected payoffs in all de-
cision problems. We characterize this ranking in static (one signal) and dynamic
(many signals) settings. While the static characterization compares posteri-
ors signal-by-signal, the dynamic characterization employs an “efficiency index”
quantifying the speed of belief convergence. Our results yield welfare-founded
quantifications of the severity of well-documented biases. Moreover, the static
and dynamic rankings can disagree, and “smaller” biases can be worse in dy-
namic settings.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Overview
A growing literature in behavioral economics studies ways in which individuals’ learn-
ing departs from correct Bayesian updating, whether due to psychological biases and
limitations or due to simplifying assumptions about a complex environment. Ex-
perimental work has documented a variety of systematic learning biases, such as
overconfidence, under- or overreaction to information, and partisan or confirmation
bias (for a recent survey, see Benjamin, 2019). Such learning biases may come to bear
on many important economic problems, from career choices to financial investment
decisions and voting, by leading to inefficient behavior.
In this paper, we ask how to compare the welfare costs of different learning biases,
and how to do so robustly, i.e., independently of the particular economic problem a
biased agent might face. Given a true signal distribution, we deem one bias more
harmful than another if it induces a lower objective expected payoff in all decision
problems. Our main results characterize this welfare ranking in both a static (one
signal observation) and a dynamic (many signal observations) setting. While the
static characterization is based on comparing interim beliefs after each signal obser-
vation, for the dynamic characterization, we introduce a “learning efficiency index”
that quantifies the speed at which beliefs converge. Thus, complementing a large the-
oretical literature that derives asymptotic beliefs under various learning biases (see
Section 1.2), a key ingredient of our analysis is to understand how learning biases
affect short- and medium-run beliefs.
Our results provide a welfare-founded approach to quantifying the severity of
specific learning biases that are documented and estimated in experiments. For some
commonly studied biases, the welfare-founded quantifications we obtain conflict with
intuitive measures of severity used in applied work. We also highlight several general
implications: In particular, the static and dynamic welfare rankings can disagree; that
is, some biases are robustly less harmful than others in the short run, but robustly
more harmful in the medium run. Moreover, according to the dynamic ranking, some
“large” biases are less harmful than other “vanishingly small” biases; indeed, when
agents are uncertain about both payoff-relevant states and the signal structure, some
biases can outperform correctly specified learning.
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Illustrative example: Asymmetric updating. To illustrate our exercise and
some of its implications, consider the following commonly studied learning bias (e.g.,
Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2014). An agent learns about some fixed
and unknown state θ (e.g., her ability) that is either low, θ, or high, θ. Prior probabil-
ities are p0(θ). She observes a sequence (x1, · · · , xT ) of T signals, drawn conditionally
i.i.d. from the binary set {x, x} with probabilities 0 < µ(x | θ) < µ(x | θ) < 1.
Thus, signal x (resp. x) is “good news” (resp. “bad news”) about θ. After each signal











where c(x) > 0 for each x. The case c(x) = c(x) = 1 corresponds to standard
Bayesian updating. By contrast, (1) can accommodate under- or overinference from
some signals and allows for these departures to vary across different signals. For
example, c(x) > c(x) captures a form of “ego-biased” updating, where the agent
reacts more strongly to good news about her ability than to bad news.
The experimental literature documents bias (1) and has estimated distortion pa-
rameters for different subjects.1 However, based on casual inspection, it might not be
obvious how to evaluate the severity of this bias under different distortion functions
c(·). This paper provides a welfare-founded approach: Suppose that, upon observing
(x1, · · · , xT ), the agent faces a decision problem, in which the payoff to each action
depends on θ and she maximizes her subjective expected payoff given her posterior
pT . Using our results, we can characterize when the agent’s welfare under distortion
c1(·) exceeds that under c2(·) robustly, i.e., regardless of which decision problem she
might face. Here, welfare is defined as the agent’s ex-ante expected payoff evaluated
according to the true probability measure over signals.
Static ranking: As a benchmark, suppose the agent observes a single signal draw
(T = 1). Then our results imply that c1(·) is less harmful than c2(·) in every decision
problem if and only if c1(·) distorts each signal less than c2(·), i.e., for each x,
c2(x) ≤ c1(x) ≤ 1 or 1 ≤ c1(x) ≤ c2(x). (2)
1The estimated parameters in Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2014) are c(x) = 0.27,
c(x) = 0.17. Subsequent work has estimated how distortion parameters vary with gender and other
demographic characteristics (see the survey by Benjamin, 2019).
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Dynamic ranking: Suppose instead that the agent has access to many signal draws.
We show that in every decision problem and for any large enough number of draws
T , the ranking depends only on the ratio ci(x)/ci(x), where welfare is higher the
“closer” this ratio is to 1. While it is easy to see that this ratio determines the agent’s
asymptotic beliefs, our key observation is that this ratio also determines the speed at
which beliefs converge. This is crucial in allowing us to compare welfare across the
large class of distortions c1(·) and c2(·) that induce the same asymptotic beliefs.
Note that the static and dynamic rankings can disagree: For instance, consider
any asymmetric distortion c1(x) 6= c1(x), no matter how close to 1, and any symmetric
distortion c2(x) = c2(x), no matter how different from 1. Then, c1(·) is worse than
c2(·) according to the dynamic ranking, even if c1(·) distorts each individual signal less
than c2(·) and hence is less harmful based on the static ranking. Moreover, measures
that are sometimes used to quantify the severity of bias (1) in applications, such as
the difference ci(x) − ci(x) (e.g., Coutts, 2019), can be inconsistent with both our
welfare-founded rankings.
Overview. Our general model (Section 2) features an arbitrary finite state space
and conditionally i.i.d. true signal structure, and we consider any learning bias that
can be represented as Bayesian updating under some possibly incorrect perception of
signal likelihoods. This encompasses misspecified Bayesian learning, as well as several
important cases of non-Bayesian learning, such as the illustrative example above.
Section 3 characterizes our welfare rankings in the binary-state setting (Section 4.1
extends to general finite state spaces). Generalizing the illustrative example, bias 1
is less harmful than bias 2 according to the static ranking if each signal is interpreted
more accurately under bias 1, as formalized by a nested likelihood ratio condition
(Proposition 1).
Our main focus is on the dynamic welfare ranking. For this purpose, we define
a learning efficiency index, which for any true and perceived signal structure cap-
tures how likely the agent is to encounter signal sequences that make her unable to
distinguish between the two states. The key observation, based on arguments from
large deviation theory, is that this efficiency index quantifies the speed at which the
agent’s beliefs converge. Using this observation, Theorems 1 and 2 show that for
any biases that give rise to the same asymptotic beliefs, the dynamic welfare ranking
is generically complete and is characterized by the learning efficiency index: With
correct (resp., incorrect) asymptotic beliefs, higher (resp., lower) learning efficiency is
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better, as this reduces the medium-run likelihood of suboptimal choices in all decision
problems. For biases that do not share the same asymptotic beliefs, the difference in
asymptotic beliefs can be used to conduct a dynamic welfare comparison.
Based on these characterizations, we discuss when the static and dynamic rankings
disagree. Intuitively, while the static ranking requires that each individual signal is
interpreted more accurately, this does not preclude some sequences of signals from
being interpreted less accurately. Indeed, if misinferences from different signals go in
opposite directions, such opposite errors can “cancel out” and lead to better learning
efficiency in dynamic settings. In addition to the illustrative example above, we also
apply our welfare rankings to learning under partisan bias and under overconfidence,
shedding light on the short- and medium-run inefficiencies these biases induce.
In our baseline model, correctly specified Bayesian learning (trivially) weakly dom-
inates all learning biases according to both the static and dynamic welfare rankings.
However, in the dynamic setting, we identify a unique class of biases, namely the
special case of (1) with a constant distortion power c (Phillips and Edwards, 1966),
that attains the same learning efficiency as the correctly specified case. As we discuss,
this implies that, in dynamic settings, any Phillips-Edwards bias, no matter how sig-
nificant, robustly outperforms any other form of bias, even if the latter is vanishingly
small. Moreover, Section 4.2 considers an extension where the agent not only learns
about a payoff-relevant state, but is also uncertain about the signal structure. Un-
der such uncertainty, we show that some learning biases strictly outperform correctly
specified learning according to the dynamic ranking, by speeding up the rate at which
the agent learns the true payoff-relevant state.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on misspecified Bayesian and non-
Bayesian learning. Much work studies how various learning biases affect asymptotic
beliefs, in both single-agent (e.g., Berk, 1966; Nyarko, 1991; Fudenberg, Romanyuk,
and Strack, 2017; Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack, 2018, 2020; He, 2018; Bushong and
Gagnon-Bartsch, 2019) and social learning settings (e.g., Eyster and Rabin, 2010;
Bohren, 2016; Gagnon-Bartsch, 2017; Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2020a). Several recent
papers provide more general criteria to determine convergence to asymptotic beliefs
(Bohren and Hauser, 2018; Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto, 2019; Frick, Iijima, and
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Ishii, 2020b; Fudenberg, Lanzani, and Strack, 2020).2 In contrast, our focus is on the
welfare implications of learning biases, and a key ingredient of our analysis concerns
short-/medium-run beliefs and the speed at which beliefs converge. In this paper,
we restrict attention to the case of single-agent learning with exogenous i.i.d. signals,
but Section 5 briefly discusses some extensions.
Our exercise is broadly related to a number of papers that examine whether and
how specific misspecifications can “survive” based on a variety of selection criteria, in-
cluding performance in competitive markets (e.g., Sandroni, 2000; Blume and Easley,
2006; Massari, 2020), goodness-of-fit tests (e.g., Cho and Kasa, 2015; Gagnon-Bartsch,
Rabin, and Schwartzstein, 2018; Schwartzstein and Sunderam, 2021), voting (e.g.,
Levy, Razin, and Young, 2019), and subjective welfare (e.g., Montiel Olea, Ortol-
eva, Pai, and Prat, 2019; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2020). The most closely related papers
within this literature are Fudenberg and Lanzani (2021) and He and Libgober (2021),
who study selection based on objective welfare. These papers take an evolution-
ary approach, by characterizing which forms of misspecification are stable against
mutations. While they conduct their analysis in a fixed environment and based on
long-run outcomes, we compare welfare across all decision problems and consider
short-/medium-run beliefs. He and Libgober (2021) show that misspecified agents
can be better off than correctly specified agents under strategic externalities. Sec-
tion 4.2 highlights an alternative mechanism in a single-agent setting, where some
forms of misspecified learning outperform correctly specified learning by speeding up
belief convergence.3
Finally, our focus on comparing welfare in all decision problems is similar in spirit
to the literature on comparisons of statistical experiments (e.g., Blackwell, 1951;
Moscarini and Smith, 2002; Azrieli, 2014; Mu, Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz, 2021).
This literature conducts robust welfare comparisons across different true signal struc-
tures assuming that agents are correctly specified, whereas we fix a true signal struc-
ture and compare welfare across different misperceptions of the signal structure. Our
2Esponda and Pouzo (2016, 2020) formalize Berk-Nash equilibrium, which captures steady states
of general misspecified learning dynamics. Spiegler (2016) formalizes a steady state notion for
subjective causal models that are captured by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs); he also asks when
one DAG is robustly better than another based on objective steady-state payoffs, and finds that no
two DAGs can be ranked in this way (except if one DAG is fully connected, i.e., correctly specified).
3Steiner and Stewart (2016); Gossner and Steiner (2018) consider static single-agent settings
and show that misspecification can be beneficial when agents cannot perfectly implement their
subjectively optimal strategies due to the presence of noise.
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static ranking is the counterpart in our setting of Blackwell’s (1951) order, while our
dynamic ranking is the analog of Moscarini and Smith (2002); indeed, as we discuss in
Remark 2, our learning efficiency index can be seen to generalize the efficiency index
in Moscarini and Smith (2002). One important difference is that if one information
structure dominates another in the sense of Blackwell (1951), this implies dominance
in the sense of Moscarini and Smith (2002), because the Blackwell order is preserved
under T -fold repetition of signal draws. In contrast, we show that our static ranking
over misperceptions can be reversed in the dynamic setting.
2 Setting
A state θ is drawn once and for all from a finite set Θ according to a full-support
distribution p0 ∈ ∆(Θ). An agent does not observe the realized state θ, but learns
about θ from signal observations. Specifically, there is a finite set of signals X, and
the agent observes a sequence of T draws of signals, xT = (x1, x2, · · · , xT ) ∈ XT .
Each signal xt is drawn conditionally i.i.d. according to a true signal structure
µ := (µθ)θ∈Θ, where µθ ∈ ∆(X) denotes the true signal distribution conditional on
state θ. Assume that each µθ has full support over X and that µθ 6= µθ′ for all θ 6= θ′.
The agent has the correct prior p0 over states, but her learning from signals is
potentially biased.4 Specifically, the agent’s perceived signal structure is µ̂ :=
(µ̂θ)θ∈Θ, where µ̂θ ∈ RX++ captures the agent’s perceived likelihood of each signal
conditional on state θ, and µ̂θ 6= µ̂θ′ for all θ 6= θ′. While we assume that µ̂θ(x) > 0
for each x ∈ X, we do not require that
∑
x∈X µ̂θ(x) = 1. As we discuss in Remark 1,
this makes it possible to accommodate both misspecified Bayesian learning as well
as certain well-studied classes of non-Bayesian learning. We call the agent correctly
specified if µ̂ = µ.
Upon observing the signal sequence xT = (x1, x2, · · · , xT ), the agent forms a
posterior belief pT (· | xT ) ∈ ∆(Θ) by applying Bayes’ rule according to her perceived
4It is straightforward to allow agents to update beliefs based on incorrect and/or heterogeneous
priors, while still defining ex-ante expected payoffs in (5) based on the true prior p0. The dynamic
welfare characterizations (Theorems 1–2) remain true unchanged. For the static characterization
(Proposition 1), we generalize condition (6) to the requirement that after each signal x, the interim
belief under µ̂1 is a convex combination of the beliefs under µ and under µ̂2.
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signal structure. That is, for all θ′ ∈ Θ,
pT (θ









After forming the posterior belief, the agent faces a decision problem , which
is a nonempty finite set A of (payoff) acts.5 An act is a vector a ∈ RΘ, where aθ
denotes the agent’s payoff from a conditional on state θ. Given any decision problem
A and realized signal sequence xT , the agent chooses an act a∗(xT ) ∈ A to maximize
her subjective expected payoff under her posterior belief pT (· | xT ):




pT (θ | xT )aθ. (4)
For ease of exposition, we assume throughout the main text that µ̂ and A are such
that (4) admits a unique solution. All results extend to the case with ties and our
proofs in the appendix allow for this possibility.6
The agent’s welfare is her ex-ante expected payoff to choosing her µ̂-subjectively
optimal act a∗(xT ) at each xT . Here, taking the perspective of an outside observer,
expectations over signal realizations are based on the true signal structure µ. That
is, letting µTθ denote the true distribution over signal sequences in XT conditional on
state θ, the agent’s welfare is given by









Remark 1. When µ̂θ ∈ ∆(X) for each θ, our setting corresponds to misspecified
Bayesian learning, capturing, for example, overconfidence (Example 2) or correla-
tion neglect (e.g., Spiegler, 2016; Enke and Zimmermann, 2017). By allowing that∑
x∈X µ̂θ(x) 6= 1, the model additionally nests several important classes of non-
Bayesian learning, including the illustrative example on asymmetric updating (Sec-
tion 1.1) and partisan bias (Example 1). At the same time, the assumption that the
posterior pT is formed according to Bayes’ rule under µ̂ rules out some other classes of
5The finiteness restriction can be relaxed when T = 1, but is important for the dynamic case.
6Specifically, the static welfare characterization (Proposition 1) remains valid as long as a fixed
tie-breaking rule (i.e., strict total order over acts) is used to select among multiple solutions to
(4). The dynamic characterizations (Theorems 1–4) remain valid even when tie-breaking rules vary
across biases µ̂.
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non-Bayesian updating, such as Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni (2010). Finally, while
we focus on the simplest possible setting of learning from exogenous i.i.d. signals,
Section 5 briefly discusses extensions to active learning or belief-dependent updating
(e.g., confirmation bias), as well as to intertemporally correlated signals. N
3 Welfare Rankings: Binary States
Given any true signal structure µ, consider two agents i = 1, 2 that differ only in their
perceived signal structures µ̂i. We seek to characterize when agent 1’s bias is robustly
less harmful than agent 2’s, in the sense that agent 1’s welfare exceeds agent 2’s
welfare at all decision problems. As a benchmark, we first consider a static welfare
ranking : This assumes that agents observe only a single signal draw (T = 1) and
requires that for all A, W1(µ, µ̂1, A) exceeds W1(µ, µ̂2, A). Our main focus is on a
dynamic welfare ranking : This assumes that agents have access to many signal
draws and requires that for all A, WT (µ, µ̂1, A) exceeds WT (µ, µ̂2, A) whenever T is
large enough.
For ease of exposition, we focus throughout this section on a binary state envi-
ronment, Θ = {θ, θ}. Section 4.1 extends the results to general finite state spaces.
3.1 Static Ranking
The following result provides a sufficient condition under which agent 1’s bias is
less harmful than agent 2’s according to the static welfare ranking: Condition (6)
requires that agent 1’s interpretation of each signal x is more accurate than agent
2’s interpretation, in the sense that the perceived signal likelihood ratio under µ̂1 is
in between the true likelihood ratio and that under µ̂2. This guarantees that agent
1’s posterior following each signal realization is a convex combination of the true
posterior and agent 2’s posterior. Hence, agent 1’s objective function is more aligned
with the true objective function than agent 2’s.7



























7The logic is similar to results on time inconsistency, where welfare is monotonic in the degree of
preference alignment between ex-ante and ex-post preferences (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001).
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Then W1(µ, µ̂1, A) ≥ W1(µ, µ̂2, A) for all decision problems A. The converse holds if
µ, µ̂1, µ̂2 satisfy the comonotonic likelikelihood ratio property.
For the necessity direction, we say that µ, µ̂1, µ̂2 satisfy the comonotonic likeli-
hood ratio property if there is a linear order > on signals such that for any x, x′ ∈ X








We note that under condition (6), the inequality W1(µ, µ̂1, A) ≥ W1(µ, µ̂2, A) is
strict in any decision problem in which the agents’ chosen acts differ at some x.
Asymmetric updating: In the illustrative example from Section 1.1, we have










, where ci(x) > 0 for each agent
i and signal x. Thus, the sufficient condition (6) for the static welfare ranking is
equivalent to the requirement (2) that for each signal x, either c2(x) ≤ c1(x) ≤ 1 or
1 ≤ c1(x) ≤ c2(x). Moreover, setting x > x and γxx = 1, true and perceived likelihood
ratios satisfy the comonotonic likelihood ratio property (7). Thus, by Proposition 1,
condition (2) is both necessary and sufficient for the static welfare ranking.
3.2 Dynamic Ranking: Correct Asymptotic Beliefs
We now characterize the dynamic welfare ranking, where for any decision problem A,
agent 1’s welfare WT (µ, µ̂1, A) exceeds agent 2’s welfare WT (µ, µ̂2, A) whenever T is
large enough. This ranking is relevant when agents have access to many signal draws,
as is natural in most learning settings.
In this section, we present our approach under the assumption that both agents’
biases are small enough that they learn the true state as T → ∞; Section 3.4 shows
how to extend this approach to the case where agents’ beliefs are asymptotically
incorrect. When asymptotic beliefs are correct under both biases, they cannot be
used to compare welfare. Instead, we show that the dynamic welfare ranking is
characterized by a learning efficiency index that captures the speed of convergence.
Formally, for any ν, µ ∈ RX+ , define the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of









with the convention that 0 log 0 = 0
0
= 0 and log 1
0
=∞. This extends the usual defini-
tion of KL divergence between probability measures to arbitrary nonnegative vectors.
We assume that both agents’ perceived signal structures µ̂i satisfy the following con-
sistency condition relative to the true signal structure µ. By standard arguments (as
in Berk, 1966), this assumption is necessary and sufficient for an agent’s belief to
converge almost surely to a point-mass on the true state as T →∞.
Assumption 1 (Consistency). For any distinct θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, we have KL(µθ, µ̂θ) <
KL(µθ, µ̂θ′).
We introduce the following learning efficiency index:
Definition 1. Given any true and perceived signal structures µ and µ̂, the learning
efficiency index is defined by w(µ, µ̂) := minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂), where
w(θ, µ, µ̂) := min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) subject to KL(ν, µ̂θ) = KL(ν, µ̂θ). (8)
We call the constraint KL(ν, µ̂θ) = KL(ν, µ̂θ) the indistinguishability condition .
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To interpret, suppose that the realized empirical signal distribution ν ∈ ∆(X)
satisfies the indistinguishability condition. Then based on observing ν, the agent is
unable to tell apart the two states θ and θ, because ν comes equally close to her
perceived signal distributions in both states. The measure w(θ, µ, µ̂) captures how
“atypical” such ν are relative to the true signal distribution µθ in state θ: The greater
w(θ, µ, µ̂), the “less likely” it is that the agent will face an empirical distribution
ν (when T is large) that does not allow her to distinguish between θ and θ. The
learning efficiency index w(µ, µ̂) considers the worst-case over all states of the measure
w(θ, µ, µ̂).
Note that the learning efficiency index is defined without reference to any decision
problem. The following theorem shows that this index characterizes the dynamic
welfare ranking. Call a decision problem A non-trivial if it does not have a dominant
act, i.e., there is no a ∈ A such that aθ ≥ bθ for all θ ∈ Θ and b ∈ A:
Theorem 1. Fix any true signal structure µ and perceived signal structures µ̂1 and
µ̂2 satisfying Assumption 1. Suppose w(µ, µ̂1) > w(µ, µ̂2). Then for any non-trivial
8Under Assumption 1, the indistinguishability condition is satisfied for some ν ∈ ∆(X).
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decision problem A, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗,
WT (µ, µ̂
1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂
2, A).
Theorem 1 implies that the dynamic welfare ranking is generically complete for all
biases satisfying Assumption 1: Given a true signal structure µ, any two such biases
µ̂1 and µ̂2 can be ranked robustly across all non-trivial decision problems, except
when their efficiency indices w(µ, µ̂1) = w(µ, µ̂2) are exactly tied.
We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix A.2. The basic idea is as follows. By Assump-
tion 1, both agents’ asymptotic beliefs are correct. Thus, in every decision problem,
they choose an ex-post optimal act with probability one as T → ∞. As a result,
comparing their welfare amounts to comparing the rate at which their probability of
making a suboptimal choice vanishes. The key observation is that, in each state θ and
for any decision problem, this probability vanishes at the same rate as the probability
that the empirical signal distribution ν approximately satisfies the indistinguishabil-
ity condition. By applying Sanov’s theorem from large deviation theory, we show that
the latter probability vanishes exponentially as T →∞, at a rate given by w(θ, µ, µ̂i).
Finally, the ex-ante welfare comparison is fully determined by the state in which this
rate is lowest, i.e., by w(µ, µ̂i) = minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂i). Note that while the indices w(µ, µ̂i)
are independent of the decision problem, the number of draws T ∗ after which these
indices characterize the welfare ranking can depend on A.9
To apply Theorem 1 to specific biases, observe that an agent’s perceived signal
structure µ̂ affects the efficiency index w(µ, µ̂) only through the indistinguishability
condition. Moreover, the set of solutions to the indistinguishability condition, which
we refer to as the indistinguishability set , is given by the hyperplane
I(µ̂) := {ν ∈ ∆(X) : KL(ν, µ̂θ) = KL(ν, µ̂θ)} = {ν ∈ ∆(X) : ν · ˆ̀= 0} (9)







is the vector of perceived log-likelihood ratios
under µ̂.









for each agent i and signal x ∈ {x, x}. Let `(x) := log µθ(x)
µθ(x)
.
9We expect that, similar to Proposition 5 in Mu, Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2021), an upper
bound on T ∗ for each A can be obtained by considering the cumulant functions of the perceived






Figure 1: Efficiency index under asymmetric updating as a function of c
i(x)
ci(x) when µθ(x) = 0.8 =
µθ(x). Assumption 1 holds iff 1/4 <
ci(x)
ci(x) < 4. When
ci(x)
ci(x) ≤ 1, we have w(µ, µ̂
i) = w(θ, µ, µ̂i) =
KL(νi, µθ). When
ci(x)
ci(x) ≥ 1, we have w(µ, µ̂
i) = w(θ, µ, µ̂i) = KL(νi, µθ). Here ν
i is given by (10).
Then, under Assumption 1,10 agent i’s indistinguishability set (9) is a singleton, with







Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the efficiency index w(µ, µ̂i) depends on agents’ distortion
functions ci(·) only through the ratio ci(x)/ci(x), and dynamic welfare is higher the
closer this ratio is to 1.
Remark 2. Moscarini and Smith (2002) (MS) study robust comparisons of true signal
structures for correctly specified agents. MS consider an index over signal structures
µ given by








and show that if wMS(µ1) > wMS(µ2), then for any non-trivial decision problem,
a correctly specified agent’s expected payoff under µ1 is higher than under µ2 for
all sufficiently large T . Using the variational formula (e.g., Dupuis and Ellis, 2011,
Lemma 6.2.3(f)), one can show that w(µ, µ) = wMS(µ), i.e., our efficiency index










. Section 3.4 revisits the
example when Assumption 1 is violated.
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reduces to MS’s index when agents are correctly specified.11 Moreover, the same
argument as in Theorem 1 implies that if w(µ1, µ̂1) > w(µ2, µ̂2), then for all non-trivial
A, WT (µ1, µ̂1, A) > WT (µ2, µ̂2, A) for all sufficiently large T . This result nests both
Theorem 1 and MS’s characterization, and additionally allows for welfare comparisons
across agents who differ both in terms of the true signal structures µi they face and
in their misperceptions µ̂i. N
3.3 Properties of the Welfare Rankings
Inconsistency between static and dynamic rankings. As the asymmetric up-
dating example illustrates, agent 1 can be strictly better off than agent 2 according to
the static ranking, but strictly worse off according to the dynamic ranking. Such in-
consistencies between the static and dynamic rankings are not specific to asymmetric
updating and can arise under many biases, including forms of misspecified Bayesian
learning.
To understand the source of these inconsistencies in general, recall that by Propo-
sition 1, µ̂1 dominates µ̂2 according to the static ranking if the interpretation of each
signal under µ̂1 is closer to the correctly specified case than under µ̂2, in the sense of
the nested likelihood ratio condition (6). Importantly, the fact that each individual
signal is interpreted more accurately does not preclude that some sequences of signals


























y, so misinferences from these signals go in opposite directions. When this is the
case, then agent 2’s inferences from sequences that contain both x and y might be
more accurate than agent 1’s if agent 2’s errors “cancel out” more. Theorem 1 for-
malizes the sense in which such canceling out of opposite errors affects the dynamic
welfare ranking: The learning efficiency indices w(µ, µ̂i) depend on µ̂i only through
the indistinguishability sets I(µ̂i), but by (9), these sets depend only on the relative










By contrast, if condition (6) is strengthened to require misinferences from all
signals to go in the same direction, then there is no scope for opposite errors to cancel
out. In this case, agent 1 is robustly better off than agent 2 after any number of
11Moreover, w(µ, µ) = w(θ, µ, µ) = w(θ, µ, µ) = minν∈∆(X) max{KL(ν, µθ),KL(ν, µθ)}. That is,
our index for correctly specified agents coincides with the Chernoff information distance between
signal distributions µθ and µθ (e.g., Cover and Thomas, 2006).
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signal draws, which implies both the static and dynamic welfare rankings:

























∀x ∈ X. (11)
Then for all decision problems A and all T , WT (µ, µ̂1, A) ≥ WT (µ, µ̂2, A).
In the asymmetric updating example, (11) holds if and only if either c2(x) ≥
c1(x) ≥ 1 ≥ c1(x) ≥ c2(x) or c2(x) ≤ c1(x) ≤ 1 ≤ c1(x) ≤ c2(x).
Large biases can be less harmful than vanishingly small biases. Since
WT (µ, µ̂, A) is the ex-ante expected payoff according to the true signal structure µ, a
correctly specified agent’s welfare is clearly at least as high as that of any other agent
in all decision problems. Thus, by Theorem 1, w(µ, µ) ≥ w(µ, µ̂) for all perceived
signal structures µ̂. However, generalizing the asymmetric updating example, the
following result shows that there is a class of biases µ̂ that achieve the same maximal
efficiency index as the correctly specified case: This class coincides exactly with the
seminal model of over-/underinference due to Phillips and Edwards (1966), where all

















We note that any µ̂ ∈ PE(µ) satisfies Assumption 1.
Proposition 3. For any true and perceived signal structures µ and µ̂ satisfying As-
sumption 1, we have w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) if and only if µ̂ ∈ PE(µ).
Proposition 3 again uses the fact that w(µ, µ̂) depends on the bias µ̂ only through
the indistinguishability set I(µ̂) given by the hyperplane (9). Thus, if µ̂ yields the
same indistinguishability set as the correctly specified case, then w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ).
Conversely, we show that any bias with w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) must satisfy I(µ̂) = I(µ).
Given this, the result follows from the observation that distorting likelihood ratios by
a constant power c is the only operation that does not affect the hyperplane I(µ), as







by the constant c.
12See Benjamin (2019)(Section 5.2) for a survey of experimental evidence. Some work in behavioral
finance (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) uses a Phillips-Edwards model with
c > 1 to capture overconfidence about signal precision.
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To interpret Proposition 3, note that w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) does not imply that
WT (µ, µ̂, A) = WT (µ, µ,A) for all large T .13 However, by the proof of Theorem 1,
w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) entails that in any decision problem, the probability of suboptimal
choices under µ̂ and µ vanishes at the same exponential rate.
A more important implication of Proposition 3 is that certain forms of “large”
biases are robustly better than other “vanishingly small” biases when agents observe
many signal draws: Indeed, fix any bias µ̂ ∈ PE(µ) with a distortion factor c that is
arbitrarily different from 1. Consider any sequence of biases µ̂n /∈ PE(µ) such that
µ̂n → µ according to an arbitrary metric on signal structures. Then by Proposition 3,
w(µ, µ) = w(µ, µ̂) > w(µ, µ̂n) for all n. Thus, any Phillips-Edwards bias µ̂, no matter
how significant, is less harmful according to the dynamic ranking than any vanishingly
small non-Phillips-Edwards biases µ̂n.
3.4 Dynamic Ranking: Incorrect Asymptotic Beliefs
We now consider the dynamic welfare ranking when Assumption 1 is violated, so
agents’ asymptotic beliefs may be incorrect in some states. The main insight is
that, when agents share the same asymptotic beliefs, this ranking is again generically
complete and can be characterized using the learning efficiency index from Section 3.2.
However, in states in which mislearning occurs, agents with a lower efficiency index
are better off.
Suppose that at least one agent’s perceived signal structure µ̂ ∈ {µ̂1, µ̂2} violates
Assumption 1 in one of the following three ways:
• Case (i): KL(µθ, µ̂θ) < KL(µθ, µ̂θ) and KL(µθ, µ̂θ) < KL(µθ, µ̂θ).
• Case (ii): KL(µθ, µ̂θ) > KL(µθ, µ̂θ) and KL(µθ, µ̂θ) > KL(µθ, µ̂θ).
• Case (iii): KL(µθ, µ̂θ) < KL(µθ, µ̂θ) and KL(µθ, µ̂θ) > KL(µθ, µ̂θ).
Case (i) obtains if and only if the agent’s asymptotic belief is almost surely a point-
mass on state θ in both states, so mislearning occurs in state θ. Similarly, in case (ii),
13Indeed, iterated application of Proposition 1 implies that for any µ̂1, µ̂2 ∈ PE(µ) whose distortion
factors satisfy 1 ≤ c1 < c2 or c2 < c1 ≤ 1, we have WT (µ, µ̂1, A) ≥ WT (µ, µ̂2, A) for all A and T ,
with strict inequality whenever the chosen acts under µ̂1 and µ̂2 differ at some signal sequences.
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mislearning occurs in state θ, while in case (iii), mislearning occurs in both states.14
If agents’ asymptotic beliefs are different, it is straightforward to determine the
dynamic welfare ranking based on these different beliefs: Specifically, if agent 1 sat-
isfies Assumption 1 (correctly learns in both states), but agent 2 does not, then for
any non-trivial decision problem A, WT (µ, µ̂1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂2, A) for all sufficiently
large T . The same is true if agent 1 satisfies case (i) or (ii), but agent 2 satisfies case
(iii). Finally, if agent 1 satisfies case (i) but agent 2 satisfies case (ii) (or vice versa),
then which agent’s welfare is higher depends on the decision problem A and prior p0.
Thus, the main challenge is how to compare dynamic welfare when agents 1 and
2 share the same asymptotic beliefs, as is the case for many different learning bi-
ases when the payoff-relevant state space is coarse (e.g., binary).15 In this case, the
following result shows that the dynamic welfare ranking is again characterized by
the state-dependent efficiency indices w(θ, µ, µ̂i). To ensure that these indices are
well-defined, we impose an assumption on both agents that guarantees that their
indistinguishability sets are nonempty. This assumption is always satisfied for mis-
specified Bayesian agents (i.e., if µ̂θ ∈ ∆(X) for all θ) and rules out extreme forms of
non-Bayesian learning:16
Assumption 2 (Non-degeneracy). For each θ ∈ Θ, there exists ν ∈ ∆(X) such that
KL(ν, µ̂θ) < KL(ν, µ̂θ′) for all θ′ 6= θ.
Theorem 2. Fix µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumption 2. Suppose one of the following
is true:
1. Both µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfy case (i) and
min
{




w(θ, µ, µ̂1), w(θ, µ, µ̂2)
}
.
2. Both µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfy case (ii) and
min
{




w(θ, µ, µ̂2), w(θ, µ, µ̂1)
}
.
14We do not consider the case when Assumption 1 is violated with equality, i.e., KL(µθ, µ̂θ) =
KL(µθ, µ̂θ′) for some θ 6= θ′. For any such bias µ̂, beliefs in state θ a.s. cycle indefinitely, which leads
to lower dynamic welfare than correct learning but higher dynamic welfare than incorrect learning.
15In general finite state spaces, the following approach based on learning efficiency is also relevant
in comparing various biases whose asymptotic beliefs differ in some states; see Section 4.1.
16Under binary states, Assumption 2 rules out non-Bayesian biases for which all signal realizations







Figure 2: Efficiency indices when µθ(x) = 0.8 = µθ(x). Figure 1 discussed the case 1/4 <
ci(x)
ci(x) <
4 (correct learning). Case (i) corresponds to c
i(x)
ci(x) > 4. As depicted, for any µ̂, µ̂
′ in this region,
w(θ, µ, µ̂) < w(θ, µ, µ̂′). Thus, by Theorem 2, dynamic welfare is determined by w(θ, µ, µ̂i) and is
higher the lower w(θ, µ, µ̂i), i.e., the smaller c
i(x)
ci(x) . Analogously, case (ii) corresponds to
ci(x)
ci(x) < 1/4,
and in this case welfare is higher the lower w(θ, µ, µ̂i), i.e., the greater c
i(x)
ci(x) .
3. Both µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfy case (iii) and w(µ, µ̂1) < w(µ, µ̂2).
Then for any non-trivial decision problem A, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗,
WT (µ, µ̂
1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂
2, A).
To understand the result, consider the first possibility, where both agents’ asymp-
totic beliefs are always a point-mass on θ. Then in state θ, both agents choose an
ex-post optimal act in the long run, so in this case a faster rate of convergence,
i.e., a higher efficiency index w(θ, µ, µ̂), is better for welfare. However, in state θ,
both agents choose the same ex-post suboptimal act in the long run, so in this case
slower convergence, i.e., a lower w(θ, µ, µ̂), is better for welfare. Thus, if both (a)
w(θ, µ, µ̂2) < w(θ, µ, µ̂1) and (b) w(θ, µ, µ̂1) < w(θ, µ, µ̂2), then agent 1 is better off.
Theorem 2 shows that the same conclusion obtains under a weaker condition that
only compares the minima of both sides of inequalities (a) and (b).



















. Case (iii) cannot arise. Assumption 2 holds as all distortion factors ci(x)
are positive. As in Section 3.2, each agent’s indistinguishability condition has a unique
solution νi given by (10). This again implies that the efficiency indices in each state
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depend on µ̂i only through the ratio ci(x)/ci(x). Figure 2 plots the efficiency indices
as a function of ci(x)/ci(x) and shows that, just as under correct learning, higher
dynamic welfare in case (i) and (ii) corresponds to ci(x)/ci(x) being closer to 1.
3.5 Examples
We present two additional examples that illustrate how our approach can be used
to understand the welfare implications of commonly studied learning biases through
their effect on short-/medium-run beliefs. For simplicity, we assume binary signals,
X = {x, x} with µθ(x) > µθ(x).
First, we provide an example of a bias for which a natural parametric quantifica-
tion of its severity is consistent with both the static and dynamic welfare rankings:
Example 1 (Partisan Bias). Consider non-Bayesian updating under partisan bias,








, for some distortion functions ηi(·)
with η2(x) > η1(x) > 1 for all x.17 That is, both agents distort inferences from all
signals in the direction of state θ (e.g., the superiority of a right-wing political policy),













for all x. Hence, Proposition 2 implies that in
every decision problem, agent 2 is worse off than agent 1 for all T . This shows that,
regardless of whether or not agents’ asymptotic beliefs are correct, more severe forms
of partisan bias are always robustly welfare-decreasing in both static and dynamic
settings, as they lead to every sequence of signals being interpreted less accurately. N
For the next bias, more severe forms need not be worse according to the static
ranking, but are robustly more harmful according to the dynamic ranking:
Example 2 (Overconfidence). Suppose agents i = 1, 2 are misspecified Bayesians
with µ̂i ∈ ∆(X) and µ̂2θ(x) > µ̂1θ(x) > µθ(x) for each θ. That is, interpreting signal
x as “success” and x as “failure,” both agents are overconfident, in the sense that
they overestimate success probabilities in all states, but agent 2’s bias is more se-
vere. Assume that agents’ perceptions also satisfy µ̂i
θ
(x) > µ̂iθ(x), which implies the
comonotonic likelihood ratio property (7).
For the static welfare ranking, observe that the fact that µ̂2θ(x) > µ̂1θ(x) > µθ(x) for
all θ does not imply condition (6). That is, more overconfident agents may interpret
17See, e.g., Bohren and Hauser (2018), Thaler (2019), and references therein to applications of the
model in political science.
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some signals more accurately. Hence, by Proposition 1 and (7), if only a single signal
is observed, there may be decision problems in which the more overconfident agent 2
performs strictly better.
For the dynamic ranking, note that for each i = 1, 2, there is a unique distribution









straightforward calculation shows that
ν∗(x) < ν1(x) < ν2(x), (12)
where ν∗ is the indistinguishable distribution in the correctly specified case. Intu-
itively, because an overconfident agent overestimates the probability of high signals
in both states, the signal distribution that makes her unable to distinguish between
θ and θ must also feature a larger fraction of high signals relative to the correctly
specified case, and more so the greater the agent’s overconfidence.
This implies that, in any decision problem, the more overconfident agent 2 is
worse off if sufficiently many signals are observed. When agent 2 mislearns (i.e.,
converges to a point-mass on θ in both states) but agent 1 learns the state correctly,
the welfare loss is driven by the difference in asymptotic beliefs, which have been the
focus of much existing work (e.g., Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack, 2018). However,
by Theorems 1–2, agent 2 is worse off even when both agents’ asymptotic beliefs are
the same (either both correct or both incorrect): This is because (12) implies that




Consider a general finite state space Θ. We focus on extending the characterization
of the dynamic welfare ranking.19 Under binary states, Theorems 1–2 showed that
the learning efficiency index yields a generically complete ranking over biases that
induce the same asymptotic beliefs. With more than two states, a complete ranking
18The reasoning is analogous to the asymmetric updating example with ci(x)/ci(x) ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2.
19For the static ranking, a sufficient condition for µ̂1 to dominate µ̂2 is that after each signal, the
interim belief under µ̂1 is a convex combination of the beliefs under µ and µ̂2, as in Section 3.1.
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is no longer possible. For example, consider any decision problem A in which all acts
yield the same payoffs in states θ and θ′. Then any bias that only affects inferences
between states θ and θ′ is payoff-irrelevant in A, but may affect welfare in decision
problems in which the payoffs in states θ and θ′ differ.
However, we show that, up to controlling for such “redundancies” of equivalent
states, the learning efficiency index can be generalized to again yield a generically
complete ranking. Formally, given any decision problem A, we consider the partition
SA over Θ whose cells are




aθ} for each θ.
That is, SA divides Θ into equivalence classes of states that share the same ex-post
optimal act (but are not necessarily payoff-equivalent for all acts in A). We then
extend the learning efficiency index to rank welfare across all decision problems A that
induce the same partition SA. Note that when Θ is binary, all non-trivial decision
problems induce the same partition.
Given any non-degenerate partition S over Θ (i.e., with S(θ) 6= Θ), we define the
S-learning efficiency index by w(µ, µ̂, S) := minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂, S), where
w(θ, µ, µ̂, S) := min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
θ′∈S(θ)
KL(ν, µ̂θ′) = min
θ′ 6∈S(θ)
KL(ν, µ̂θ′).
Generalizing Definition 1, the indistinguishability condition minθ′∈S(θ) KL(ν, µ̂θ′) =
minθ′ 6∈S(θ) KL(ν, µ̂θ′) in state θ now captures the set of empirical distributions ν based
on which the agent is unable to distinguish whether the state is in S(θ) or Θ\S(θ). As
before, w(θ, µ, µ̂, S) measures how unlikely such empirical distributions ν are under
the true signal distribution µθ, and the learning efficiency index w(µ, µ̂, S) considers
the worst-case measure across all states.
The following condition generalizes Assumption 1. Given a partition S of Θ, we
require that in each state θ, the agent asymptotically assigns probability one to the
correct cell S(θ). However, the condition does not restrict asymptotic beliefs over
states in S(θ), allowing for some forms of mislearning and for comparisons across
biases whose asymptotic beliefs need not coincide in each state:
Assumption 3 (S-consistency). For every θ ∈ Θ, we have minθ′∈S(θ) KL(µθ, µ̂θ′) <
minθ′ /∈S(θ) KL(µθ, µ̂θ′).
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Under Assumption 3, we obtain the following generalization of Theorem 1: The S-
learning efficiency index characterizes when agent 1’s welfare exceeds agent 2’s welfare
in all decision problems with partition S. We focus on perceived signal structures that
are non-degenerate in the sense of Assumption 2, and on regular decision problems
A, where aθ 6= a′θ for all θ and distinct a, a′ ∈ A.
Theorem 3. Let S be a non-degenerate partition over Θ. Fix any true signal structure
µ and perceived signal structures µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumptions 2–3. Suppose
w(µ, µ̂1, S) > w(µ, µ̂2, S). Then for any non-trivial and regular decision problem A
with SA = S, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗, WT (µ, µ̂1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂2, A).
Thus, up to restricting to decision problems that feature the same classes of equiv-
alent states, the dynamic welfare ranking is again generically complete.20 As in Sec-
tion 3.3, biases of the Phillips-Edwards form achieve the maximal efficiency index for
any partition S.
Online Appendix B provides an analogous extension of Theorem 2, where for a
given partition S, we assume that in each state θ, both agents’ asymptotic beliefs
assign probability one to the same, but possibly incorrect, cell S(θ′).
4.2 Uncertainty about Signal Structures
Consider an agent who, instead of dogmatically perceiving a particular signal struc-
ture µ̂, entertains multiple possible signal structures and jointly updates about both
payoff-relevant states and signal structures. Such uncertainty about the signal struc-
ture can be interpreted as capturing some “cautiousness” against misspecification
(e.g., Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz, 2016). We extend the dynamic welfare
ranking to this setting. Relative to the baseline model without uncertainty about sig-
nal structures, a key difference is that now correctly specified agents can be robustly
worse off than misspecified agents.
As in Section 2, there is a finite set Θ of payoff-relevant states from which the
true state is drawn according to a full-support distribution p0, and a fixed true signal
structure µ := (µθ)θ∈Θ. The agent learns jointly about payoff-relevant states and
20Analogous to Remark 2, Theorem 3 extends to the case where both the true signal structure
µi and perceived signal structures µ̂i differ across agents. This result nests the general state char-
acterization for the correctly specified case in Moscarini and Smith (2002), who restrict attention
to decision problems A for which the ex-post optimal act in each state is different. Moscarini and
Smith’s (2002) proof approach relies on correctly specified agents.
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signal structures, under a possibly misspecified model that may assign zero probability
to the true signal structure: Let M̂ denote the set of signal structures the agent deems
possible, where µ̂ := (µ̂θ)θ∈Θ ∈ (∆(X))Θ for each µ̂ ∈ M̂ .21 The agent’s prior belief
is some full-support q0 ∈ ∆(M̂ × Θ), where we do not require that margΘq0 = p0
(recall the discussion in footnote 4). The agent is correctly specified if the true
signal structure µ is contained in her subjective model M̂ .
Upon observing a signal sequence xT = (x1, · · · , xT ), generated i.i.d. according to
the true signal structure, the agent Bayesian-updates her belief to











Given any decision problem A ⊆ RΘ, the agent chooses a subjectively optimal act ac-
cording to her posterior belief margΘqT over payoff-relevant states, where as before, we
assume away indifferences. Analogous to (5), define the agent’s welfare WT (µ, q0, A)
as her objective expected payoff according to the true signal structure µ and prior p0
over Θ.
For simplicity, we focus on binary payoff-relevant states, Θ = {θ, θ}. Moreover,
we restrict attention to agents who correctly learn the payoff-relevant state θ, as is
ensured by imposing Assumption 1 on each µ̂ ∈ M̂ . Thus, we isolate the effect of
uncertainty about the signal structure on the speed of convergence of beliefs about θ,
rather than on asymptotic beliefs about θ:
Assumption 4. For any distinct θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and each µ̂ ∈ M̂ , we have KL(µθ, µ̂θ) <
KL(µθ, µ̂θ′).
We obtain the following generalization of Theorem 1. Define the learning effi-
ciency index by w(µ, M̂) := minθ w(θ, µ, M̂), where
w(θ, µ, M̂) := min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
µ̂∈M̂
KL(ν, µ̂θ) = min
µ̂∈M̂
KL(ν, µ̂θ).
The indistinguishability condition minµ̂∈M̂ KL(ν, µ̂θ) = minµ̂∈M̂ KL(ν, µ̂θ) again cap-
tures the empirical signal distributions ν that do not allow the agent to tell apart
states θ and θ. Here, in each state θ, the agent uses the signal distribution µ̂θ that
21We assume that each perceived signal distribution µ̂θ ∈ ∆(X) is a probability measure, but the








Figure 3: Indistinguishable distributions ν∗ under M̂ = {µ} and ν1 under M̂1 = {µ, µ̂1}.
comes closest to ν among all the distributions she deems possible. Note that the
agent’s prior belief over signal structures in M̂ does not affect the efficiency index.
When M̂ is a singleton, the index reduces to the one in Definition 1.
Theorem 4. Fix any µ and qi0 ∈ ∆(M̂ i × Θ) (i = 1, 2) with M̂ i satisfying Assump-
tion 4. Suppose w(µ, M̂1) > w(µ, M̂2). Then for any non-trivial decision problem A,
there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗, WT (µ, q10, A) > WT (µ, q20, A).
Clearly, based on objective welfare, an agent with subjective model M̂ = {µ},
i.e., who is certain of the true signal structure, weakly outperforms any other agent
in all decision problems and for all T . Thus, the learning efficiency index w(µ, {µ})
is maximal.
However, a key implication of Theorem 4 is that correctly specified but uncertain
agents can be robustly worse off than misspecified agents when T is large. Indeed,
the following example exhibits M̂1, M̂2 such that µ ∈ M̂1 \ M̂2 but w(µ, M̂2) >
w(µ, M̂1). Thus, in any decision problem, the correctly specified agent 1’s welfare
is strictly lower than that of the misspecified agent 2 after sufficiently many signal
observations. Note that, by Assumption 4, both agents learn the true payoff-relevant
state θ asymptotically; however, agent 1 is robustly worse off because her beliefs about
θ converge more slowly.22 Moreover, since the learning efficiency indices w(µ, M̂ i) do
not depend on the priors qi0, agent 1 is worse off than agent 2 even if her prior assigns
high probability to the true signal structure µ.
Example 3 (Correctly specified agents can be worse off). Suppose X = {x, x}.
Consider some true signal structure with µθ(x) < µθ(x). As noted, if M̂ = {µ},
the learning efficiency index is maximal, and the indistinguishability set in this case
consists of a single distribution ν∗. The key observation is that if an agent is correctly
22Absent Assumption 4, some correctly specified but uncertain agents may fail to learn the true
payoff-relevant state asymptotically, due to (non-generic) identification problems that lead to in-
complete learning (e.g., if M̂ = {µ, µ̂} with µθ = µ̂θ′ for all θ 6= θ′). Such agents are dynamically
worse off than any agent satisfying Assumption 4.
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specified but uncertain about the signal structure, this may reduce her efficiency index
by altering her indistinguishability set. For example, suppose agent 1 is uncertain
between the true signal structure and some perception µ̂1 that is overconfident in the
sense of Example 2. That is, M̂1 = {µ, µ̂1}, where µ̂1θ(x) > µθ(x) for all θ. Then, as
shown in Figure 3, the unique indistinguishable distribution ν1 satisfies ν1(x) > ν∗(x).
By contrast, consider any misspecified agent 2 with a unique indistinguishable
distribution ν2 that is closer than ν1 to ν∗. For example, suppose M̂2 = {µ̂2}, where
µ̂2 is also overconfident (i.e., µ̂2θ(x) > µθ(x) for all θ) but sufficiently less so than µ̂1.
Then w(µ, µ) > w(µ, M̂2) > w(µ, M̂1). N
This example highlights a rationale for why larger subjective models M̂ , i.e.,
greater “caution,” can reduce an agent’s welfare: Entertaining an additional possible
signal structure may lead to more medium-run mistakes, by increasing the likelihood
of observing “confusing” signal sequences that make it impossible to distinguish be-
tween different states.23 At the same time, learning under any model M̂ at least
outperforms learning under the worst signal structure µ̂ in its support:24
Proposition 4. Fix any µ and M̂ satisfying Assumption 4. Then




This paper conducts a robust comparison of objective welfare across a wide range
of learning biases. Our core results characterize this welfare comparison in dynamic
settings, using a learning efficiency index: Complementing a focus in the literature on
asymptotic beliefs, this index determines the speed of belief convergence under each
bias, by quantifying the likelihood with which agents encounter signal sequences that
do not allow them to distinguish different states. We highlight that learning efficiency
23This point is reminiscent of the phenomenon of “overfitting,” where statistical predictions can
become less accurate if a model uses too many variables relative to the size of observations (e.g.,
Montiel Olea, Ortoleva, Pai, and Prat, 2019). It also relates to Blume and Easley (2006), who in a
competitive market setting with multidimensional states show that agents whose prior is correctly
supported on a lower-dimensional set of states outperform agents with a higher-dimensional full-
support prior.
24We also note that if µ 6∈ M̂ , it is not in general true that w(µ, M̂) ≤ maxµ̂∈M̂ w(µ, µ̂). That
is, in some cases, entertaining uncertainty over multiple misspecified signal structures can robustly
outperform learning under each individual signal structure.
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can be strictly lower for smaller biases or for biases that are less harmful in static
settings, and that correctly specified but uncertain agents can be outperformed by
misspecified agents. We apply our results to provide welfare-founded quantifications
of the severity of various commonly studied biases.
There are several directions in which to extend our analysis. First, beyond the
focus on exogenous i.i.d. signals in this paper, it is natural to consider settings with (i)
intertemporally correlated signals or (ii) endogenous signals. For (i), it is straightfor-
ward to extend the dynamic characterization based on learning efficiency to exogenous
but Markovian signals, by invoking appropriate generalizations of Sanov’s theorem.
This extension can accommodate additional biases, such as the gambler’s and hot-
hand fallacies (e.g., Rabin and Vayanos, 2010) and intertemporal correlation neglect
(e.g., Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015). For (ii), our companion note (in preparation)
extends the dynamic welfare analysis to simple settings in which the agent’s current
belief can affect the true and perceived signal distributions, capturing some forms
of misspecified active learning or belief-dependent updating (e.g., confirmation bias).
One finding is that such endogenous signals always lead to lower learning efficiency
than the corresponding exogenous signal structures.
Second, we have focused on learning biases that can be represented as Bayesian
updating under some possibly incorrect perception of signal likelihoods. Important
features of this setting are that (i) agents’ posterior beliefs depend only on the em-
pirical signal distribution (rather than the exact signal sequence), and (ii) for almost
all empirical signal distributions, agents’ posteriors become confident in a particular
state as T →∞. The same large deviation techniques on which our dynamic charac-
terization relies can also be used to conduct dynamic welfare comparisons for other
non-Bayesian learning models that share these features.25
Finally, our analysis can serve as a starting point to robustly quantify the welfare
implications of some design interventions for biased learning. As an illustration,
consider the effect of coarsening signals, i.e., partitioning the signal space X and
only revealing the realized cell. For correctly specified agents, coarsening signals
always reduces welfare. However, for a misspecified Bayesian agent, some forms of
25For example, in Cripps (2018), an agent distorts beliefs based on some homeomorphism F :
∆(Θ) → ∆(Θ) before performing Bayesian updating, and then applies the inverse map F−1 to the
updated belief before making a decision. Assuming that F maps each point-mass belief to itself (to
guarantee that asymptotic beliefs are correct), similar arguments as in Theorem 1 imply that this
bias has the same learning efficiency index as the correctly specified case.
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coarsening can robustly improve welfare in dynamic settings, either by shifting the
agent’s indistinguishability set closer to the correctly specified case or by affecting the
agent’s asymptotic beliefs. In the former case, we can use our learning efficiency index
to quantify and decompose the effect of coarsening: Let µ, µ̂ (resp. µ′, µ̂′) denote the
true and perceived signal structures before (resp. after) coarsening. Then
w(µ′, µ̂′)−w(µ, µ̂) = [w(µ′, µ′)− w(µ, µ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
information loss
+ [w(µ, µ)− w(µ, µ̂)]− [w(µ′, µ′)− w(µ′, µ̂′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in welfare costs of misperceptions
.
The first term captures the information loss due to coarsening and is always negative.
The second term compares the extent of welfare loss due to misperception before
and after coarsening. This term can be positive and overwhelm the first term if the
welfare loss before coarsening, w(µ, µ)−w(µ, µ̂), is sufficiently larger than the welfare
loss after coarsening, w(µ′, µ′) − w(µ′, µ̂′). Online Appendix C provides an example
in the context of overconfidence.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We prove a slight generalization of Proposition 1 that allows decision problems to
feature ties: For each decision problem A, we assume some arbitrary strict total order
A over A such that whenever (4) admits multiple solutions for an agent, she chooses
the A-optimal act among these solutions. Note that both agents are assumed to use
the same tie-breaking rule.
Suppose that (6) holds for all x ∈ X. Fix any decision problem A. For each
realized signal x, let px denote the posterior belief under µ, and p̂ix denote the posterior
belief under µ̂i (i = 1, 2). Let aix ∈ argmaxa∈A a · p̂ix denote the action chosen by agent
i (with tie-breaking according to A in case of indifference).
By (6) and the fact that Θ = {θ, θ} is binary, there is βx ∈ [0, 1] such that
p̂1x = βxpx + (1− βx)p̂2x. Thus, for all a ∈ A,
a · p̂1x = βxa · px + (1− βx)a · p̂2x. (14)
We claim that
a1x · px ≥ a2x · px. (15)
Indeed, if βx = 0, then by (14), both agents share the same interim payoffs. Thus,
a1x = a
2
x (using the assumption that agents follow the same same tie-breaking rule),
which implies (15). If βx > 0, then (15) follows from (14) and the fact that
a1x · p̂1x ≥ a2x · p̂1x and a1x · p̂2x ≤ a2x · p̂2x.


















x · px = W1(µ, µ̂2, A).
For the converse direction, assume that µ, µ̂1, µ̂2 satisfy the comonotonic likelihood
ratio property for some linear order > on X. Suppose that (6) is violated at some x∗ ∈






and `(x) := µθ(x)
µθ(x)
for each x. Since (6) is violated at x∗, we either
have (i) `1(x∗) > `2(x∗) and `1(x∗) > `(x∗), or (ii) `1(x∗) < `2(x∗) and `1(x∗) < `(x∗).
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We consider only case (i), as the argument for case (ii) is analogous. Take any
`∗ ∈ (max{`(x∗), `2(x∗)}, `1(x∗)). The comonotonic likelihood ratio property ensures
that for each i = 1, 2, we have `(x), `i(x) > `∗ if x > x∗, while we have `(x), `i(x) < `∗
if x < x∗.




+ aθ − aθ = 0. Let ax (resp. aix) denote the act that maximizes the





x = a for x > x∗, ax = a1x = a2x = a for x < x∗, but ax = a2x = a 6= a = a1x
for x = x∗. This implies W1(µ, µ,A) = W1(µ, µ̂2, A) > W1(µ, µ̂1, A), as desired.
A.2 Proof of Theorems 1 and 3
Below, we prove Theorem 3. Theorem 1 follows immediately from Theorem 3: Indeed,
Assumption 1 implies Assumptions 2–3; moreover, for binary states, it is without loss
of generality to focus on regular decision problems.26
Section A.2.1 first analyzes an agent’s choices over pairs of acts, while Section A.2.2
considers general decision problems. Section A.2.3 proves Theorem 3. Throughout,
we let Pθ denote the probability measure over signal sequences induced by repeated
i.i.d. draws according to the true signal distribution µθ in state θ.
A.2.1 Binary comparisons over acts
Consider an agent with perceived signal structure µ̂. Fix any acts a and a′. Define
the set of states where a is preferred to a′ ex-post by
Θaa′ := {θ ∈ Θ : aθ > a′θ}.
Let log µ̂θ := (log µ̂θ(x))x∈X ∈ RX . For any ε ∈ R, define
Cεaa′ :=
{
ν ∈ ∆(X) : max
θ∈Θaa′
ν · log µ̂θ ≥ max
θ∈Θa′a
ν · log µ̂θ + ε
}
.
Letting νt denote the empirical signal distribution following t draws of signals,
26To see the latter, suppose A is not regular. Then some distinct acts a, a′ ∈ A have the same
payoff in some state. When Θ is binary, this implies a ≥ a′ or a′ ≥ a. Then removing the dominated
act does not change the agent’s choices since her posterior after every signal history has full support.
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Given this, the following lemma shows that for large t, the set of empirical signal
distributions under which the agent prefers a to a′ can be bounded using Cεaa′ :
Lemma 1. Fix any ε > 0 and acts a, a′ with neither a ≥ a′ nor a′ ≥ a. There exists
t such that for all t ≥ t,
Cεaa′ ⊆
{
ν ∈ ∆(X) :
∑
θ∈Θ




ν ∈ ∆(X) :
∑
θ∈Θ
(aθ − a′θ)etν·log µ̂θ+log p0(θ) ≥ 0
}
⊆ C−εaa′ .
Proof. Since neither a ≥ a′ nor a′ ≥ a, both Θaa′ and Θa′a are nonempty. Thus,










(aθ − a′θ), max
θ∈Θa′a
(a′θ − aθ).







− |Θ|K > 0.
To show the first desired inclusion, note that for any ν ∈ Cεaa′ and t ≥ t,∑
















etν·log µ̂θ+log p0(θ) − |Θ|Ket(maxθ∈Θaa′ ν·log µ̂θ−ε)+maxθ log p0(θ)












Likewise, to show the final inclusion, note that for any ν /∈ C−εaa′ and t ≥ t,∑





















ν·log µ̂θ+minθ log p0(θ)
= e










Lemma 2. Suppose that neither a ≥ a′ nor a′ ≥ a and that Assumption 2 is satisfied.
Then for each θ∗ ∈ Θ, minν∈Cε
aa′
KL(ν, µθ∗) is well-defined and continuous in ε in a
neighborhood of ε = 0.
Proof. Since a  a′ and a′  a, Θaa′ ,Θa′a are both nonempty. By Assumption 2,
Cεaa′ is nonempty for ε close to 0. Since Cεaa′ is compact and KL(·, µθ∗) is continuous (as
µθ∗ has full support), minν∈Cε
aa′
KL(ν, µθ∗) is well-defined for all ε in a neighborhood
of 0.
We now verify that Cεaa′ is a continuous correspondence at ε = 0, which ensures
that minν∈Cε
aa′
KL(ν, µθ∗) is continuous in ε at ε = 0 by Berge’s theorem of the
maximum. It is straightforward to prove that Cεaa′ is upper-hemicontinuous in ε.
To see that Cεaa′ is also lower-hemicontinuous at ε = 0, take any ν ∈ C0aa′ and any
sequence εn → 0. If maxθ∈Θaa′ ν · log µ̂θ > maxθ∈Θa′a ν · log µ̂θ, then ν ∈ C
εn
aa′ for
n sufficiently large. Thus, assume maxθ∈Θaa′ ν · log µ̂θ = maxθ∈Θa′a ν · log µ̂θ. Pick
any θ′ ∈ argmaxΘaa′ ν · log µ̂θ. Then ν · log µ̂θ′ = maxθ∈Θa′a ν · log µ̂θ. Moreover, by
Assumption 2, there exists ν ′ ∈ ∆(X) such that
ν ′ · log µ̂θ′ > max
θ∈Θa′a
ν ′ · log µ̂θ.
Thus, for n sufficiently large, there exists κn ∈ [0, 1] such that limn→∞ κn → 1 and
(κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) · log µ̂θ′ = max
θ∈Θa′a
(κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) · log µ̂θ + |εn|.
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Then (κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) ∈ Cεnaa′ and limn→∞(κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) = ν. This establishes
lower hemicontinuity.
Finally, we use Sanov’s theorem to characterize the rate (possibly zero) at which
the probability of choosing a over a′ vanishes as t→∞:
Lemma 3. Suppose that neither a ≥ a′ nor a′ ≥ a and that Assumption 2 is satisfied.









logPθ [{pt · (a− a′) ≥ 0}]
= min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
θ′∈Θaa′
KL(ν, µ̂θ′) ≤ min
θ′∈Θa′a
KL(ν, µ̂θ′).




















Pick any ε > 0 small enough that Cεaa′ is nonempty, which exists by Lemma 8.





logPθ[{νt ∈ Cεaa′}] ≥ − inf
ν∈int(Cεaa′)












In the first line, int denotes the interior of a set and the equality follows from the
continuity of KL(ν, µθ) in ν (as µθ has full support). Thus, taking the limit as ε→ 0















KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
θ′∈Θaa′





A.2.2 General decision problems
Continue to fix a perceived signal structure µ̂. We turn to general decision problems.
Building on Lemma 3, the following lemma uses our learning efficiency index to
characterize the rate at which the probability of choosing an ex-post suboptimal act
vanishes as t→∞ under Assumption 3.
Lemma 4. Let A be a regular and non-trivial decision problem and suppose that
Assumption 2 and SA-consistency (Assumption 3) are satisfied. Fix θ∗ ∈ Θ and let
a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A aθ∗ denote the ex-post optimal act at θ∗. Then


















pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0
}]
.
Proof. Since a∗ is uniquely optimal at θ∗ (by regularity of A), we have a 6≥ a∗ for all
a ∈ A \ {a∗}. Consider any a ∈ A \ {a∗} with a∗ 6≥ a, which exists as A is non-trivial.









logPθ∗ [{pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0}]
= min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ∗) s.t. min
θ′∈Θaa∗





KL(ν, µθ∗) s.t. min
θ′∈Θaa∗
KL(ν, µ̂θ′) = min
θ′∈Θ
KL(ν, µ̂θ′),
where the final equality holds as Θaa∗ and Θa∗a partition Θ by regularity of A. At
the same time, for any a 6= a∗ with a∗ ≥ a, Pθ∗ [pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0] = 0 for all t, as pt
always has full-support.
Since Θ \ SA(θ∗) =
⋃













logPθ∗ [{pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0}]
= min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ∗) s.t. min
θ′ 6∈SA(θ∗)





KL(ν, µθ∗) s.t. min
θ′ 6∈SA(θ∗)
KL(ν, µ̂θ′) ≤ min
θ′∈SA(θ∗)
KL(ν, µ̂θ′).
We claim that the last line is equal to w(θ∗, µ, µ̂, SA). Consider any solution ν to the
minimization problem. We show that minθ′ 6∈SA(θ∗) KL(ν, µ̂θ′) = minθ′∈SA(θ∗) KL(ν, µ̂θ′),
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i.e., the constraint holds with equality. Indeed, note that by SA-consistency, ν 6= µθ∗ .
Thus, if minθ′ 6∈SA(θ∗) KL(ν, µ̂θ′) < minθ′∈SA(θ∗) KL(ν, µ̂θ′), then by strict convexity of
KL(·, µθ∗), we can choose ε > 0 sufficiently small such that ν ′ = (1 − ε)ν + εµθ∗
still satisfies the constraint but achieves a strictly smaller objective KL(ν ′, µθ∗), a
contradiction.
Hence, exchanging lim and max, we have






Pθ∗ [{pt · (a− a∗) > 0}] , (17)






Pθ∗ [{pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0}] . (18)
Finally, for each t,
max
a∈A\{a∗}










pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0
}]
≤ (|A| − 1) max
a∈A\{a∗}
Pθ∗ [{pt · (a− a∗) ≥ 0}] .
Combined with (17) and (18), we obtain the desired conclusion.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Fix any partition S of Θ and µ, µ̂1, µ̂2 satisfying Assumptions 2–3. Suppose w(µ, µ̂1, S) >
w(µ, µ̂2, S) and consider any non-trivial and regular decision problem A with SA = S.
Let piT ∈ ∆(Θ) denote the (random) posterior of agent i following T signal draws.
Slightly generalizing the main text, we allow for the possibility that (4) features mul-
tiple subjectively optimal acts at some posteriors. In this case, agents employ an
arbitrary strict total order over A to break ties, where tie-breaking rules can differ
across agents.
Since A is regular, for each state θ, there is a unique ex-post optimal act aθ ∈
argmaxa∈A aθ. Since A and Θ are finite, there exists a constant K > 0 such that for
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piT · (a− aθ) ≥ 0
}]














piT · (a− aθ) > 0
}]
.
Note the inequalities hold regardless of how agents break ties in case of indifference.
Thus, to show that there exists T ∗ such that WT (µ, µ̂1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂2, A) for all











T · (a− aθ) ≥ 0












T · (a− aθ) ≥ 0





e−T minθ w(θ,µ,µ̂1,SA)+o(T )
, ∀θ.
Since minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂1, SA) > minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂2, SA), this implies (19) for all T sufficiently
large.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2







































∀xT ∈ XT .
Thus, the same argument as in Proposition 1 yields thatWT (µ, µ̂1, A) ≥ WT (µ, µ̂2, A)
for any decision problem A (where we can again allow for ties as long as both agents
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use the same tie-breaking rule).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We first establish the following lemma, which will be used to prove the “only if”
direction of Proposition 3:
Lemma 5. Fix any µ. There exists a unique ν∗ ∈ I(µ) such that w(µ, µ) =
KL(ν∗, µθ) = KL(ν
∗, µθ). Moreover, ν
∗(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and there exist λθ, λθ > 0
and Cθ, Cθ ∈ R such that
∇νKL(ν∗, µθ) =
(














Proof. By definition, ν ∈ I(µ) if and only if KL(ν, µθ) = KL(ν, µθ). Thus, w(µ, µ) =
KL(ν∗, µθ) = KL(ν
∗, µθ) if and only if ν
∗ ∈ argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ) = argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ).
Moreover, argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ) = {ν∗} is a singleton, since I(µ) is nonempty, com-
pact and convex and KL(·, µθ) is continuous and convex.
To see that ν∗(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X, suppose instead that ν∗(x) = 0 for some
x ∈ X. Consider any other ν̂ ∈ I(µ) with ν̂(x) > 0.27 For each ε ∈ [0, 1], consider






contradicting the fact that ν∗ ∈ argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ).
For the final part, consider state θ; the argument for state θ is analogous. Since
ν∗(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X, KL(ν, µθ) is differentiable in ν at ν∗. As we saw in the proof













for some x such that µθ(x) > µθ(x). The case µθ(x) < µθ(x) is analogous.
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of Lemma 4, ν∗ ∈ ∆(X) also solves the following relaxed problem:
min
ν∈∆(X)










Thus, we have the following first-order conditions at ν∗: There exist Lagrange multi-














0, since µθ 6= µθ. Thus, λθ > 0. Since ∇νKL(ν∗, µ′) =
(






µ′ ∈ int∆(X), (20) becomes
∇νKL(ν∗, µθ) =
(







Proof of Proposition 3: For the “if” direction, suppose µ̂ ∈ PE(µ). Then, as noted
in the main text, I(µ̂) = I(µ). Thus, w(µ, µ) = w(µ, µ̂).
For the “only if” direction, suppose that µ̂ /∈ PE(µ). By Lemma 5, there exists a
unique ν∗ ∈ I(µ) such that ν∗(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and
w(µ, µ) = KL(ν∗, µθ) = KL(ν
∗, µθ).
First, suppose that ν∗ /∈ I(µ̂). Then either KL(ν∗, µ̂θ) < KL(ν∗, µ̂θ) or KL(ν∗, µ̂θ) <
KL(ν∗, µ̂θ). We only consider the former case, as the latter case is analogous. As in
the proof of Lemma 4, w(θ, µ, µ̂) can equivalently be written as the value of the
following relaxed problem:
w(θ, µ, µ̂) = min
ν′∈∆(X)
KL(ν ′, µθ) s.t. KL(ν
′, µ̂θ) ≤ KL(ν ′, µ̂θ). (21)
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Since KL(·, µ̂θ) and KL(·, µ̂θ) are continuous, for ε ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small,
KL((1− ε)ν∗ + εµθ, µ̂θ) < KL((1− ε)ν∗ + εµθ, µ̂θ).
Thus, (1− ε)ν∗ + εµθ satisfies the constraint in (21). But, by convexity of KL(·, µθ)
and since w(µ, µ) > 0 (because µθ 6= µθ)
KL((1− ε)ν∗ + εµθ, µθ) ≤ (1− ε)KL(ν∗, µθ) + εKL(µθ, µθ) < w(µ, µ).
Thus, w(µ, µ̂) ≤ w(θ, µ, µ̂) < w(µ, µ).
Next, suppose that ν∗ ∈ I(µ̂). Since µ̂ /∈ PE(µ) and
I(µ) =
{











there exists ν ∈ I(µ̂) \ I(µ). Then either ν · log µθ
µθ
< 0 or ν · log µθ
µθ
< 0. We only
consider the former case, as the latter case is analogous. For each ε ∈ (0, 1), define
νε = (1− ε)ν∗ + εν.
Since both ν∗, ν ∈ I(µ̂), we have νε ∈ I(µ̂). Moreover, by Lemma 5, there exists









Thus, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, we have νε ∈ I(µ̂) and KL(νε, µθ) < KL(ν∗, µθ) =
w(µ, µ). Hence, w(µ, µ̂) ≤ w(θ, µ, µ̂) < w(µ, µ).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumption 2. Take any non-trivial decision problem A.
It is without loss to assume that A contains no dominated acts, since agents would
never choose such acts given that their posteriors pTi have full support at each signal
history. As in the proof of Theorem 3, we allow for the possibility that (4) features
multiple subjectively optimal acts at some posteriors, in which case agents employ
(possibly different) tie-breaking rules.
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Let a (resp. a) denote the unique act in A that is ex-post optimal at θ (resp. θ).
Since A does not contain dominated acts, we have
[aθ < aθ,∀a ∈ A \ {a}] and [aθ < aθ,∀a ∈ A \ {a}]. (22)














piT · (a− a) > 0
}]













piT · (a− a) ≥ 0
}]
Thus, to show that there exists T ∗ such that WT (µ, µ̂1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂2, A) for all




























Since both agents satisfy case (i), the same argument as in Lemma 4 implies that
for all θ and i = 1, 2,


















piT · (a− a) ≥ 0
}]
.
Hence, the fact that min{w(θ, µ, µ̂1), w(θ, µ, µ̂2)} < min{w(θ, µ, µ̂2), w(θ, µ, µ̂1)} im-
plies (23) for all sufficiently large T .
Second part: The proof is analogous to the first part.
Third part: By (22), there exists a constant K > 0 such that for all T and
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piT · (a− a) > 0
}]











piT · (a− a) ≥ 0
}]
.
Thus, to show that there exists T ∗ such that WT (µ, µ̂1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂2, A) for all




























Since both agents satisfy case (iii), the same argument as in Lemma 4 implies that
for each i = 1, 2,


















piT · (a− a) ≥ 0
}]


















piT · (a− a) ≥ 0
}]
.
Hence, the fact that minθ w(µ, µ̂1) < minθ w(µ, µ̂2) implies (24) for all sufficiently
large T .
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof follows the same arguments as in Theorem 3 and is thus omitted. In
particular, analogous to Lemma 4, one can show that, in any non-trivial decision
problem, w(θ, µ, M̂ i) corresponds to the exponential rate at which the probability
that agent i chooses an ex-post suboptimal act in state θ vanishes as T →∞.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Observe that
w(θ, µ, M̂) = min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
µ̂∈M̂







KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
µ̂′∈M̂









Here, the first and the last equalities follow from the definition of the efficiency index
and Assumption 4 by analogous arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4. A similar
argument shows w(θ, µ, M̂) ≥ minµ̂∈M̂ w(θ, µ, µ̂). Thus, w(µ, M̂) ≥ minµ̂∈M̂ w(µ, µ̂).
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Online Appendix to “Welfare Comparisons for
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Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, and Yuhta Ishii
B Extension of Theorem 2 under General States
We extend Theorem 2 to general finite state spaces Θ. As in Section 3.4, we consider
perceived signal structures µ̂ satisfying Assumption 2 (Non-degeneracy). We allow for
arbitrary correct or incorrect asymptotic beliefs: We only require that in each state
θ, asymptotic beliefs under µ̂ are a point-mass on some state θ′, ruling out cycling.
Assumption 5 (No cycling). For every θ ∈ Θ, there exists θ′ ∈ Θ with KL(µθ, µ̂θ′) <
KL(µθ, µ̂θ′′) for all θ′′ 6= θ.
Given any partition S over Θ, Assumption 5 implies that in each state θ, asymp-
totic beliefs under µ̂ assign probability one to some (possibly incorrect) cell Sµ̂(θ) ∈ S
given by
Sµ̂(θ) = S(θ
′), where {θ′} = argmin
θ′′∈Θ
KL(µθ, µ̂θ′′).
Theorem 5 below will compare dynamic welfare across any biases µ̂1 and µ̂2 under
which asymptotic beliefs concentrate on the same cell Sµ̂1(θ) = Sµ̂2(θ) =: Ŝ(θ) in
each state θ; however, asymptotic beliefs within cells may differ across µ̂1 and µ̂2.
As in Section 4.1, we obtain a generically complete welfare ranking over such
biases up to restricting to subclasses of decision problems. Given any regular decision
problem A, let α(θ) = argmaxa∈A aθ denote the unique ex-post optimal act in state θ.
Let SA denote the partition over Θ whose cells are SA(θ) = {θ′ ∈ Θ : α(θ) = α(θ′)}.
If asymptotic beliefs in state θ concentrate on cell ŜA(θ) ∈ SA, let â(θ) := α(θ′) for
some θ′ ∈ ŜA(θ) denote the induced (asymptotically) subjectively optimal act. Then
A induces a partition of each Θ \ ŜA(θ) into
S+A (θ) := {θ
′′ ∈ Θ : αθ(θ′′) > âθ(θ)} , S−A (θ) := {θ
′′ ∈ Θ : αθ(θ′′) < âθ(θ)} ,
where S+A (θ) (resp. S
−
A (θ) ) consists of all states θ
′′ whose ex-post optimal act α(θ′′)
yields higher (resp. lower) payoffs in state θ than act â(θ).
We define a learning efficiency index that allows one to robustly rank dynamic
welfare in all decision problems A that induce the same collections S+ := (S+A (θ))θ∈Θ
and S− := (S−A (θ))θ∈Θ. Given any such collections S
+ and S−, define
w+(µ, µ̂, S+) := min
θ∈Θ
w(θ, µ, µ̂, S+(θ)), w−(µ, µ̂, S−) := min
θ∈Θ
w(θ, µ, µ̂, S−(θ)),
1
where for any Θ′ ⊆ Θ, the index
w(θ, µ, µ̂,Θ′) := min
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) subject to min
θ′∈Θ′
KL(ν, µ̂θ′) = min
θ′ /∈Θ′
KL(ν, µ̂θ′)
measures how unlikely it is in state θ to encounter empirical signal distributions ν that
make it impossible to distinguish states in Θ′ vs. Θ \Θ′. We set w(θ, µ, µ̂, ∅) =∞.
Based on the learning efficiency indices w+(µ, µ̂, S+) and w−(µ, µ̂, S−), we obtain
the following characterization of the dynamic welfare ranking. We strengthen non-
triviality to the requirement that decision problems are essential , in the sense that
|A| > 1 and A ⊆ α(Θ), i.e., each act in A is ex-post optimal in some state.
Theorem 5. Fix any µ, µ̂1, µ̂2 satisfying Assumptions 2 and 5. Consider any
partition S of Θ such that Sµ̂1(θ) = Sµ̂2(θ) =: Ŝ(θ) for all θ, and any partition
{S+(θ), S−(θ)} of Θ \ Ŝ(θ) for each θ. Suppose that
min
{




w+(µ, µ̂1, S+), w−(µ, µ̂2, S−)
}
. (25)
Then for any regular and essential decision problem A with SA(θ) = S(θ), S+A (θ) =
S+(θ) and S−A (θ) = S
−(θ) for all θ, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗,
WT (µ, µ̂
1, A) > WT (µ, µ̂
2, A).
Remark 3. Theorem 5 generalizes both Theorems 2 and 3 (up to strengthening non-
triviality to essentiality). When Θ = {θ, θ}, it is easy to verify that all three cases in
Theorem 2 yield the ranking (25).
Theorem 3 assumes S-consistency (Assumption 3). In this case, Sµ̂i(θ) = S(θ)
for all θ and i = 1, 2, so S+A (θ) = ∅ and S
−
A (θ) = Θ \ S(θ) for all A with SA = S.
Thus, w+(µ, µ̂i, S+) = ∞ and w−(µ, µ̂i, S−) = w(µ, µ̂i, S). Hence, (25) reduces to
w(µ, µ̂1, S) > w(µ, µ̂2, S). N
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5
B.1.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Fix any regular and essential decision problem A with induced partition SA =: S.
Fix any µ̂ satisfying Assumptions 2 and 5. Write Ŝ(θ) := Sµ̂(θ), S+(θ) := S+A (θ),
S−(θ) := S−A (θ), and w
+(θ, µ, µ̂) := w(θ, µ, µ̂, S+(θ)), w−(θ, µ, µ̂) := w(θ, µ, µ̂, S−(θ)).
Let A+(θ) := {a ∈ A : aθ > âθ(θ)}, A−(θ) := {a ∈ A : aθ < âθ(θ)}.
As in Appendix A.2, for any distinct a, a′ ∈ A, define Θaa′ := {θ ∈ Θ : aθ > a′θ}.
By regularity of A, Θaa′ ∪Θa′a = Θ. For any ε ∈ R, define
Cε,µ̂a,a′ :=
{
ν ∈ ∆(X) : max
θ∈Θaa′
ν · log µ̂θ > max
θ∈Θa′a







For each a ∈ A, we observe that
C0,µ̂a =
{
ν ∈ ∆(X) : max
θ∈α−1(a)
ν · log µ̂θ > max
θ/∈α−1(a)
ν · log µ̂θ
}
. (26)





ν ∈ ∆(X) : max
θ∈α−1(a)
ν · log µ̂θ ≥ max
θ/∈α−1(a)
ν · log µ̂θ
}
, (27)
because if ν · log µ̂θ′ = maxθ/∈α−1(a) ν · log µ̂θ for some θ′ ∈ α−1(a), then ((1 − ε)ν +
εν ′) · log µ̂θ′ > maxθ/∈α−1(a)((1 − ε)ν + εν ′) · log µ̂θ for any ε ∈ (0, 1) and any ν ′ such
that ν ′ · log µ̂θ′ > ν ′ · log µ̂θ for all θ 6= θ′ (which exists by Assumption 2).
Lemma 6. For each θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A, we have
w+(θ, µ, µ̂) = inf
a∈A+(θ),ν∈C0,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ), w
−(θ, µ, µ̂) = inf
a∈A−(θ),ν∈C0,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ).
Proof. We prove the result for w+. The proof for w− is analogous. Observe that
inf
a∈A+(θ),ν∈C0,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ) = inf
ν∈∆(X)








KL(ν, µθ) s.t. max
θ′∈S+(θ)
ν · log µ̂θ′ ≥ max
θ′ /∈S+(θ)
ν · log µ̂θ′
= inf
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) s.t. max
θ′∈S+(θ)
ν · log µ̂θ′ = max
θ′ /∈S+(θ)
ν · log µ̂θ′ .
Indeed, the first equality follows by continuity of KL, and the second equality follows
from (27) and the fact that S+(θ) = α−1(A+(θ)). To see the last equality, consider
the case in which the inequality constraint in the second line is feasible (if infeasible,
then the equality constraint in the third line is also infeasible) and suppose for a
contradiction that under any ν that achieves the infimum value the constraint holds
with a strict inequality. Note that ν 6= µθ for any such ν, as argmaxθ′∈Θ µθ · log µ̂θ′ ∈
Sµ̂(θ) and Sµ̂(θ) ∩ S+(θ) = ∅. Now consider ν̂ = λν + (1 − λ)µθ, which satisfies
maxθ′∈S+(θ) ν̂ ·log µ̂θ′ > maxθ′ /∈S+(θ) ν̂ ·log µ̂θ′ if λ < 1 is sufficiently close to 1. By strict
convexity of Kullback-Leibler divergence, we then have KL(ν̂, µθ) < λKL(ν, µθ) <




KL(ν, µθ) s.t. max
θ′∈S+(θ)
ν · log µ̂θ′ = max
θ′ /∈S+(θ)
ν · log µ̂θ′
= inf
ν∈∆(X)
KL(ν, µθ) s.t. min
θ′∈S+(θ)
KL(ν, µ̂θ′) = min
θ′ /∈S+(θ)
KL(ν, µ̂θ′)
= w+(θ, µ, µ̂),
3
as required.
Lemma 7. For each ε > 0 and a ∈ A, there exists t∗ such that for all t ≥ t∗,
Cε,µ̂a ⊆
{

























Proof. Since A is essential, α−1(a) 6= ∅. Since A is regular, there exists K > 0











|a′θ − a′′θ | < K.






p0(θ) > |Θ|K max
θ∈Θ
p0(θ).
To show the first set inclusion, consider any ν ∈ Cε,µ̂a and t ≥ t∗. For any a′ 6= a, note
that ν ∈ Cε,µ̂a,a′ ensures ν ·log µ̂θ′ ≥ maxθ∈Θa′a ν ·log µ̂θ+ε, where θ
′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θaa′ ν ·
log µ̂θ. Then∑
θ∈Θ
(aθ − a′θ)p0(θ)etν·log µ̂θ =
∑
θ∈Θaa′
(aθ − a′θ)p0(θ)etν·log µ̂θ +
∑
θ∈Θa′a



















To show the last set inclusion, consider any ν /∈ C−ε,µ̂a and t ≥ t∗. Since ν /∈ C−ε,µ̂a ,
ν 6∈ C−ε,µ̂a,a′ for some a′ 6= a. Thus ν · log µ̂θ′ − ε ≥ maxθ∈Θaa′ ν · log µ̂θ, where
θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θa′a ν · log µ̂θ. Then observe that∑
θ∈Θ
(aθ − a′θ)p0(θ)etν·log µ̂θ =
∑
θ∈Θaa′
(aθ − a′θ)p0(θ)etν·log µ̂θ +
∑
θ∈Θa′a
(aθ − a′θ)p0(θ)etν·log µ̂θ
≤ K|Θaa′ | max
θ∈Θaa′
p0(θ)e
















Lemma 8. For each θ∗ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A, infν∈Cε,µ̂a KL(ν, µθ∗) is finite and continuous
in ε in a neighborhood of 0.
Proof. Since A is regular and essential, α−1(a) and Θ \ α−1(a) are both non-empty.
Thus, by Assumption 2, Cε,µ̂a is nonempty for ε close to 0. Since C
ε,µ̂
a is com-
pact and KL(·, µθ∗) is continuous (as µθ∗ has full support), infν∈Cε,µ̂a KL(ν, µθ∗) =
inf
ν∈Cε,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ∗) is finite for all ε in a neighborhood of 0.
We now verify that Cε,µ̂a is a continuous correspondence at ε = 0, which ensures
that infν∈Cε,µ̂a KL(ν, µθ∗) is continuous in ε at ε = 0 by Berge’s theorem of the maxi-
mum. It is straightforward to prove that Cε,µ̂a is upper-hemicontinuous in ε.
To see that Cε,µ̂a is also lower-hemicontinuous at ε = 0, take any ν ∈ C
0,µ̂
a
and any sequence εn → 0. Note that (27) holds at ε = 0. If maxθ∈α−1(a) ν ·
log µ̂θ > maxθ/∈α−1(a) ν · log µ̂θ, then ν ∈ Cεn,µ̂a for n sufficiently large. Thus, assume
maxθ∈α−1(a) ν · log µ̂θ = maxθ/∈α−1(a) ν · log µ̂θ. Pick any θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈α−1(a) ν · log µ̂θ.
Then ν · log µ̂θ′ = maxθ/∈α−1(a) ν · log µ̂θ. Moreover, by Assumption 2, there exists
ν ′ ∈ ∆(X) such that ν ′ · log µ̂θ′ > maxθ/∈α−1(a) ν ′ · log µ̂θ. Thus, for n sufficiently large,
there exists κn ∈ [0, 1] such that limn→∞ κn = 1 and
(κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) · log µ̂θ′ = max
θ/∈α−1(a)
(κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) · log µ̂θ + |εn|.
Then (κnν + (1− κn)ν ′) ∈ C
εn,µ̂
a and limn→∞(κnν + (1−κn)ν ′) = ν. This establishes
lower hemicontinuity.
Finally, consider any µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumptions 2 and 5 and such that
Sµ̂i(θ) = Ŝ(θ) for all θ and i = 1, 2.







































Proof. By Lemma 8, Cε,µ̂1a and Cε,µ̂
2
a are non-empty for any ε in some open neigh-














KL(ν, µθ) = inf
ν∈Cε,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ)
where the equality follows from the continuity of KL(ν, µθ) in ν (as µθ has full sup-
port). Thus, limt→∞ 1t logPθ
[
{νt ∈ Cε,µ̂a }
]
= − infν∈Cε,µ̂a KL(ν, µθ).
5
The above implies the desired claim based on standard arguments from large
deviation theory (e.g., Lemma 1.2.15 in Dembo and Zeitouni, 2010).
B.1.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Take µ̂1, µ̂2, S, S+, and S− as in Theorem 5. Consider any regular and essential A
with SA = S, S+A = S
+, S−A = S
−. By regularity of A, there exist M < M such that








|aθ − âθ(θ)| < M.
For each µ̂ ∈ {µ̂1, µ̂2}, Lemma 6 implies that
w+(θ, µ, µ̂) = inf
a∈A+(θ),ν∈C0,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ), w
−(θ, µ, µ̂) = inf
a∈A−(θ),ν∈C0,µ̂a
KL(ν, µθ).
Since min {w+(µ, µ̂2, S+), w−(µ, µ̂1, S−)} > min {w+(µ, µ̂1, S+), w−(µ, µ̂2, S−)}, Lemma 8














































































































LetWT (µ, µ̂i, A, θ) denote objective expected payoffs conditional on state θ. Then,
applying Lemma 7, we have that, for all sufficiently large T ,
WT (µ, µ̂







































Similarly, for all sufficiently large T ,
WT (µ, µ̂
























































































µ, µ̂ x0 x1 x2
θ 0.3, 0.1 0.4, 0.5 0.3, 0.4
θ 0.4, 0.3 0.5, 0.6 0.1, 0.1
µ′, µ̂′ {x0, x1} {x2}
θ 0.7, 0.6 0.3, 0.4
θ 0.9, 0.9 0.1, 0.1
Figure 4: Left: True and perceived signal distributions µ, µ̂ before coarsening. Right: True and
perceived signal distributions µ′, µ̂′ after coarsening signals by bunching together x0 and x1.
C Coarsening Signals: An Example
We provide an example where coarsening signals (see Section 5) can robustly improve
welfare by strictly increasing a biased agent’s learning efficiency. Consider the state
space Θ = {θ, θ} and signal space X = {x0, x1, x2} ⊆ R with x0 < x1 < x2.
Suppose the true and perceived signal distributions µ, µ̂ before coarsening are as
shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 4. Note that µ̂θ ≥FOSD µθ for all θ, i.e.,
the agent is overconfident. The agent’s asymptotic beliefs are correct (Assumption 1
holds), and her learning efficiency index can be computed as w(µ, µ̂) = w(θ, µ, µ̂) ≈
0.00009.
Now, consider the effect of coarsening signals by bunching together x0 and x1.
This results in the true and perceived signal structures µ′, µ̂′ shown in the right-hand
panel of Figure 4. Assumption 1 continues to hold, but the efficiency index increases
to w(µ′, µ̂′) = w(θ, µ′, µ̂′) ≈ 0.013. Thus, by the generalization of Theorem 1 in
Remark 2, coarsening robustly improves dynamic welfare. Intuitively, before coars-
ening, the agent’s misinferences from signals x0 and x1 go in opposite directions;
bunching these two signals together shifts the agent’s indistinguishability set closer
to the correctly specified case.
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